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Abstract. Planning and predicting the experiences that buildings will produce is an essential part of architectural design. The 
importance of representation lies in its ability to communicate experiences before a building is materialized. This article will treat 
the topic of representation of architecture works without putting aside our direct experience with edifices. By understanding the 
perceptual, associative and interactive phenomena that arise from the human encounter with buildings, it becomes possible to 
comprehend the representation of these phenomena through pictorial means. The first objective of this theoretical article is to 
define the inherent and unavoidable factors that are present in the creation and interpretation of all architectural representations, 
regardless of the technical means used. Any representation conveys two processes: the representation of experience (a creative 
process), and the experience of representation (an interpretive process). Furthermore, there exist two layers in any representation: 
the what (the architectural object) and the how (the representational medium). The second objective is to suggest alternatives to 
visual realism, in order to create representations that embody the particular phenomena that an architectural work will be able to 
produce. On the one hand, representations that pretend to copy reality produce in the observers detailed visual experiences; on the 
other hand, certain representations reflect the experiences themselves after they have been produced; they represent buildings as 
they are transformed by experience. This article focuses on those representations that are not only the reflection of an object, but 
also the reflection of our way of experiencing it. 
Keywords: representation, architecture, experience, attention, perception, communication.
Introduction: qualitative representation in 
architecture
This article addresses the question of how represen-
tations show or predict experiences and is, therefore, 
interested in the ostensive or communicative function 
of representation. Plans and sections provide the di-
mensions of the architectural spaces and elements; by 
doing so, they allow buildings to be built but do not 
show their appearance. Lockard (1982: 72) distinguishes 
between qualitative representations, such as perspecti-
ve drawings, and quantitative representations, focused 
on measurements: “Perspectives are more qualitative 
than quantitative. The experiential qualities of an en-
vironment or object can be perceived directly from a 
perspective.”. Visualization images or renderings are the 
types of representation that best satisfy the ostensive 
function. These qualitative representations of archi-
tecture, by showing the appearance of buildings, could 
be classified as experiential representations, as opposed 
to representations of measurable “realities.”
Much of the theory of architectural representation 
has been focused on the types of graphical projection. 
However, although building representation takes 
advantage of descriptive geometry in order to create 
quantitative representations, it is not limited to it. 
Indeed, while trying to show an architectural object, 
or the idea of  an architectural object, the maker has to 
consider the experience that the representation will 
create for the end viewers. The maker is thus aware 
of the perceptual processes that his or her work is 
able to produce. This makes it clear that descriptive 
geometry does not tell us everything there is to know 
about representation in architecture. This research is 
interested precisely in the cognitive aspect that un-
derlies all qualitative or experiential architectural 
representations.
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The referential quality of representation;  
the experience of architecture as the origin of 
representation
According to Boudon and Poussin (1993: 105), the re-
ferent of a representation is the “real or virtual object 
that the figure refers to.” When talking about the re-
ferent of a representation, it could be understood that 
what is represented is something external and inde-
pendent of the human being. However, by taking the 
experience of architecture as the referent, both the 
architectural work and the way our own physiologi-
cal and cognitive mechanisms make us experience 
architecture in a particular way are taken into con-
sideration. What is depicted on paper, then, are not 
“realities,” but experiences of objects. Gubern (1987: 
116–17) remarks that iconic representations are not 
similar or related to objects, but rather to the visual 
percept of these objects. The visual appearance of an 
object and our general experience of it are humanly 
inseparable of the object; it is thus impossible to truly 
represent reality, i.e. to represent it removing all traces 
of the particular manner the world is experienced by 
humans. An object is not represented as it is directly 
received by us, but as it is interpreted or perceived: 
with its size calculated according to the distance at 
which we localize it in space, with surface colors re-
ceiving a certain lighting, etc. Therefore, what is really 
represented is the experience of an existing or a non-
existing object – an experience that, in most cases, is 
a visual one.
The expression “representation of an experience” 
does not necessarily mean the representation of the 
experience we are having at this moment; we might 
want to capture a past experience, or it may be that 
the experience to be represented has not happened 
yet, and we want to predict it. The latter situation is, 
actually, the most common in architectural repre-
sentation. When representing a present experience, 
the maker faces a referent – the architectural space 
or element being experienced – that he captures into 
an image or physical model (Boudon et al. 1993: 22). 
On the contrary, when a representation is made by 
memory, the strokes drawn by the maker are based 
on his or her mental image or internal representa-
tion of a previous experience with these architectural 
elements.
Furthermore, exploratory models and drawings 
allow creating while representing; they thus entail 
both a representational and a strong creative compo-
nent. Ideational representation, unlike other types of 
representation, refers to those designs whose referent 
is originally non-existent and emerges during the act 
of representation. As stated by Peterson Littenberg, 
“It is not just a rendering of what is already known: 
the production of the drawing itself constitutes de-
sign.” (Allen et al. 1981: 106).
Owing to its divergent nature, this type of repre-
sentation is the one used in creative thinking, as it 
is useful for generating ideas. The epitome of idea-
tional representation is the sketch which, due to its 
unfinished nature, is left open to interpretation – as 
is a Rorschach inkblot test – , allowing new design 
alternatives to be explored. According to Goel (1992: 
66), while sketching the designer explores with lateral 
transformations: “ . . . where movement is from one 
idea to a slightly different idea rather than a more 
detailed version of the same idea.”
Robert A. M. Stern notes that to draw “. . . is at once 
an imitation of previous realities and an imitation of 
realities to come.” (Allen et al. 1981: 88). Therefore, 
while the origin (referent) of a representation can 
vary, as it can be the product of memory, ideation or 
another process, the “origin of this origin” is always 
our previous experience of the world, the “imitation 
of previous realities,” in the words of Stern.
Beyond ideational representation, a visualization 
is an image or model that also shows the non-existent, 
but tends to be specific and well-defined, as it does 
not aim to translate ideas onto paper for working pur-
poses, but to allow to communicate to the end viewers 
an architectural environment before its realization. 
Since visualizations e.g. perspectives show more ar-
chitectural details – compared with the spontaneous 
ideational representations – , they require planning 
and are usually created based on other representa-
tions in which ideas have been already worked out. 
Thus, creating visualizations does not consist of de-
signing while representing. In a contradictory man-
ner, a perspective created by a rigorous construction 
method is quantitative in its creation, but the created 
image results qualitative, since it shows clearly the 
appearance of an architectural space.
The visualization image of a project is commonly 
known as a rendering, “ . . . an effective way of presen-
ting an architectural project as if it were already part of 
reality.” (Bernath 2007: 45). Due to the lack of a proper 
referent, visualizations, like fiction films, are objects 
that produce what Metz (1982: 40) calls the referential 
illusion, or the previous existence effect: “ . . . a product 
which is its own production in reverse.” . Representations 
that show as existing something that does not exist are 
the main subject of this article (Fig. 1).
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fig. 1. Dichotomies discussed in this chapter; the category on 
which this article will be focused appears encircled
The recognizable quality of representation; the 
interpretation of architectural representations
Architectural visualization has a double intention: on 
the one hand, it proposes a project’s or a building’s 
intent, and on the other, it aims to communicate. If 
the only inherent quality of a representation was that 
it is created in reference to something, the person who 
represents would be the only one who notices that the 
object being created is a representation, as it could 
not be interpreted as such by the viewers. Indeed, the 
factors that allow the existence of representations – 
such as the intention of the maker or, in the case of 
photography, the photochemical process involved in 
their production – do not make the viewer capable of 
interpreting a representation qua representation. Black 
(1973: 111) warns about this point: “Suppose I set out 
to draw a horse and, in my lack of skill, produce so-
mething that nobody could distinguish from a cow by 
simply looking; would it then necessarily be a drawing 
of a horse, just because that was what I had intended?”
In addition to the referent, any representation 
consists of two other elements: the representing and 
the represented; the former is “the material aspect 
of a graphism” (Boudon et al. 1993: 105), while the 
latter is the object or scene evoked in the viewer based 
on the representing. However, it is not possible to 
understand the representing without the represen-
ted that emerges before us; just as it is not possible 
to analyze a figure independently of the represen-
tational experiences that it induces in us. It makes 
no sense, therefore, to address the representing or 
vehicle in itself, as it is a blind spot in our experience 
of a representation (Fig. 2).
The term “representation” can refer to both the 
material object or the representing (e.g. the painting, 
the photograph, the sculpture) and the act of creating 
this object, that is, choosing a referent and depicting 
it in a representational object. However, to consider 
a representation as a resulting object is an incomple-
te approach, for this representational object is not 
a static or finished product, but something created 
to be experienced, i.e. an object capable of evoking 
the represented in the mind of the viewer. Duchamp 
states: “The spectator makes the picture.” (Judovitz 
1987: 187). It may be asserted that for the viewers – 
including the maker – , a representation is an object 
that brings about an interpretive process which, in 
turn, completes the work (Fig. 3).
fig. 2. Cittá Nuova, antonio Sant´Elia, 1913–14 (Magnago 
1983: 69).
Note: It is impossible to distinguish between the lines and 
drawing elements that are part of the physical vehicle or 
the representing, and the lines or stripes that are part of the 
architectural object represented, such as buttresses, ribs, 
slits and shadows. The distinction between the representing 
elements and the represented elements is thus a theoretical 
one that only prevents us from understanding the true 
experience of representation.
fig. 3. Drawing no. 126 in Fundamentals of Contemporary 
Architecture (Chernikhov 1930: 77).
Note: Through the use of unconnected planes, Chernikhov sets 
in motion the viewer’s ability to perceptually complete a three-
dimensional shape, which is then recognized as a building.
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According to Schier (1986: 186–87), the human 
being’s natural ability to recognize objects is what 
allows him or her to interpret representations: “The 
respect in which S resembles its depictum O is this: 
there is an overlap between the recognitional abilities 
triggered by S and O.” For an iconic representation to 
be considered as such, it does not only need to have 
been created based on a referential object; it must 
also be able to show this object, in other words, a 
representation must always be recognizable. We can 
thus speak of a representation if and only if it has 
been intentionally created as such and it functions as 
such. The first condition excludes the figures in rocks 
and random stains from being representations, while 
the latter excludes unintelligible scribbles.
The inherent qualities of experiential 
representation
Based on what has been said in the preceding paragraphs, 
it can be stated that there are two types of process that 
are inevitably embedded in images or models of buil-
dings: the process of capturing an architectural referent 
in some material medium, and the process of interpreting 
a representation from the part of the viewer. Trying to 
define representation – and establishing the qualities for 
a representational work to be considered as such – is a 
difficult task if no distinction is made between the re-
presentation of experience (a creative process), the expe-
rience of representation (an interpretive process), and the 
two layers or levels of representation proposed here: the 
what (the architectural object) and the how (the repre-
sentational medium). The what has been referred to as 
the “content,” “meaning,” “message” or “subject,” while 
the how has been seen as equivalent to concepts such as 
“form,” “expression,” “medium,” “signifier” and “physical 
vehicle,” among others. On the one hand, a representa-
tion aims to show an architectural object – the what of 
representation – and on the other, a representation is an 
object that is of a different nature than a work of archi-
tecture and involves a particular way of showing it – the 
how of representation. The what is the component of re-
presentation that is commonly considered independent 
of the representational medium and the way it has been 
produced (the how), e.g. the house that is represented, 
whether by a model or a photograph (Table 1).










How How is itrepresented?
How is it
experienced?
The what of the representation of experience is the 
referent on which the maker bases his or her work and 
which he tries to capture. Representation is thus refe-
rential.
The what of the experience of representation is, for 
example, the architectural object that is interpreted 
through the representational work, i.e. the represented. 
For interpretation to be carried out, the representation 
must be recognizable.
Since the first two qualities described above are 
closely related to each other, they can be considered as 
two sides of the same process of representation; while 
depicting the qualities of an object, indeed, the maker 
of a representation is able to recognize that object in 
his or her creation.
The how of the representation of experience, as for it, 
is the material medium through which the represented 
is evoked. Because the referent is recreated in a diffe-
rent medium than its original one, it can be said that 
representation is transcriptional.
Finally, the how of the experience of representation is 
the particular phenomena that arise from the viewer’s 
encounter with a representation, which are different 
from the direct experience he or she would have from 
a real architectural work. Any representation is an ar-
tificial object intentionally created to be recognized as 
another object; it therefore triggers experiences of an 
object without actually being what is shown. This is the 
reason why representation is always fictional. Based on 
the four qualities described above, a representation can 
thus be defined as a referential transcription causing 
fictional recognition.
This paper addresses the qualities of representation 
related to the what or the content of representation; it 
will not delve into the techniques of its creation and 
the particular experiences related to them, i.e. the how. 
Regarding the architectural content of a representation, 
it should be noted that two other factors are implicit in 
the qualities of being referential and recognizable. As 
mentioned earlier, a representation originates from the 
referent. However, it is important to specify that when 
creating a representation, some, but not all aspects or 
elements of the referent are depicted; representation 
can thus be said to be selective. Moreover, given that a 
representation only displays some of the object’s fea-
tures, directing the viewer’s attention and making him 
or her focus on certain aspects of the object, it is also 
directive regarding the viewer’s experience of this object 
(Table 2). In the following sections, the selective and 
directive qualities of representation will be discussed, 
emphasizing how these factors manifest themselves in 
an architectural representation.
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Table 2. The sine qua non qualities or conditions of 











originates from an 




includes only some 
aspects or elements of 
the referent and is thus:
selective
What is experienced?
a representation is 
interpreted as an 




directs or focuses the 
viewer´s attention 
towards certain 
aspects of the object 
and is thus:
directive
The selective quality of representation and 
the selective processes in the experience of 
architecture
Art corrects and simplifies nature. It reveals and 
reunites in one particular place and, according 
to a particular perception, everything beauti-
ful and spare that our consciousness can grasp 
(Massimo Scolari 2007: 13).
It is impossible to experience an object “as it truly 
is,” just as it is impossible to have a thorough knowledge 
of it: there is a series of filters through which the human 
being experiences reality, as well as other filters – in-
herently human as well – that interfere with the way 
something is represented. Representation is selective 
because experience itself is selective, and it is also limi-
ted: our sensory receptors act as filters as they impose 
certain limits – like visual acuity or the size of our vi-
sual field – on our view of the world. In addition, our 
ability to pay attention to objects in the environment 
is also limited, as is our capacity to understand what 
is presented to us, and we have physical limitations to 
interacting with the world. Therefore, the aspects of re-
ality that we experience – the ones we can have access to 
in a specific environment – depend on all these factors, 
and a representation based on our experience can only 
be a partial reflection of the outside world.
If an experience is the way something is presented, 
to represent is to capture, in a specific medium, some 
of the many aspects or qualities that an object may 
possess. According to Goodman (1968: 6): “ . . . the 
world is as many ways as it can be truly described, seen, 
pictured, etc., . . . there is no such thing as the way the 
world is.” Representation is selective not only because 
of its inability to include all aspects of our experience 
of objects, but also because the person creating a repre-
sentation or planning a building is interested in some 
of the referent’s elements, or some phenomena produ-
ced by the architectural work, more than in others. A 
contour drawing is the result of the human tendency to 
see some features of an object, like edges and outlines, 
as more relevant than other features, these lines then 
become: “ . . . the most informative iconic feature . . .“ 
(Gubern 1987: 112). This representational technique 
has resulted useful in architecture, since it shows the 
boundaries of the physical object depicted (Fig. 4).
In addition to being selective by capturing the 
object’s elements or qualities that are considered 
more relevant, representation is also selective be-
cause it establishes a point of view and frames the 
area of the environment that is presented. In archi-
tectural visualization, a particular time of day – with 
its specific lighting conditions – is, in most cases, 
chosen as well.
fig. 4. antoine Predock sketch for the american Heritage 
Center and art Museum, laramie, Wyoming, 1988. © antoine 
Predock architect PC. 
Note: The selective quality of representation is more apparent 
in drawings that focus on the contours of the most prominent 
shapes than in “realistic” representations which, apparently, 
do not privilege certain features of the referent over others. 
The directive quality of representation; 
architectural representation as a frozen and 
pre-selected experience
... Drawing and painting can also teach us to 
recognize, classify and specify a visual and 
emotional effect that has always been present 
in our experience, but that we had only appreci-
ated through that code (Montes 1992: 180) (free 
translation by the author).
A photograph has the power to make us appreciate 
or reconsider the object shown, to such an extent that a 
building that we usually overlook when walking down 
a street can become an object of appreciation and ana-
lysis. As stated by Sontag (1977: 28): “To photograph is 
to confer importance.” From this it may be concluded 
that two complementary processes occur in any repre-
sentation: what is considered to be important is repre-
sented, and what is represented gains in importance. As 
a consequence of its selective quality, a representation 
has the ability to focus or direct the viewer’s attention 
towards certain elements that are shown as being more 
important (Figs 5–6). The selective and directive qu-
alities of representation are highlighted by Allen and 
Oliver (1981) in what follows:
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An architect ś early design sketches, tentati-
ve and evocative, can often give a remarkably 
accurate idea of the overall impression the final 
building is intended to make, and they usually 
do this without much regard to many of the de-
tails. (…) Their power is that they limit what is 
being portrayed and therefore dramatize cer-
tain architectural aspects while muting or even 
altogether silencing others. (p. 14).
Representation is more effective in directing 
the viewer’s attention to one aspect of the displayed 
object than is direct experience with that object or 
scene. When we directly experience a rapidly moving 
object, for example, we may or may not pay atten-
tion to the fact that it is out of focus before our eyes. 
However, a photograph taken at a slow shutter speed, 
in which the moving object appears blurred, makes 
this phenomenon impossible to go unnoticed by the 
viewer of the image.
Also, the connection between the frame captu-
red by the camera and the human visual field is not 
noticed by the viewer when the vertical and horizon-
tal lines of the rectangular frame match the objects’ 
orientation. However, while talking about the frame 
fig. 6. rough Grounds, octagon House, Gloucestershire, uK, 
Pierre D´avoine architects, 2006. © Pierre D´avoine architects.
Note: representation, by isolating some of the multiple 
factors present in a work of architecture, directs our attention 
to one or more of them. In this case, the architect may intend 
to highlight the perceptual dissolution of a house which is 
surrounded by a forest.
fig. 5. Masonry design. (Viollet-le-Duc 1864, plate XXII).
Note: By fading the non-essential aspects (selective quality 
of representation), this representation was planned for us to 
focus on the metal structure supporting the domes (directive 
quality of representation).
in cinema, Metz (1982: 55) highlights the role of un-
conventional camera angles in directing the viewer’s 
attention: “. . . the uncommon angle makes us more 
aware of what we had merely forgotten to some extent 
in its absence: an identification with the camera (with 
‘the author’s viewpoint’).” (Fig. 7).
With regard to comics, the viewer’s implicit point 
of view and the proximity of the viewed object may 
serve to emphasize the viewer’s relationship with the 
things being portrayed, and the same could apply to 
representation in architecture (Fig. 8). Eisner (2000: 
89) describes how comics may create an emotional 
response in the reader: “Looking at a scene from 
above it the viewer has a sense of detachment – an 
observer rather than a participant. However, when 
the reader views a scene from below it, then his po-
sition evokes a sense of smallness which stimulates 
a sensation of fear.”
Unlike a three-dimensional representation and, 
even more so, a real-life architectural experience, 
a two-dimensional representation (whether it is a 
picture, a series of pictures or a movie) functions as 
an inflexible guide in our vicarious experience of the 
architectural object, as it does not allow us to choose 
what to look at or from which point of view to look 
at it. Even in an animation or a video showing what 
a viewer sees while moving, a specific route has been 
pre-selected that focuses on specific experiential as-
pects and objects of the environment.
Pictorial images are “objectifications” of pheno-
mena made accessible to others (Kondor 2011: 68); by 
representing architecture, the various dynamic fac-
tors that determine our experience of buildings are 
frozen in the form of an image or model. Therefore, 
it is more difficult to analyze the experiences that 
give rise to representations than the representations 
themselves; in the first case, indeed, we deal with 
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something intangible, while in the second, we deal 
with “objects” or experiences frozen in physical or 
digital media. As noted by Walter Benjamin (1980: 
212): “Anyone will be able to observe how much more 
easily a painting and above all, a sculpture or ar-
chitecture, can be grasped in photographs than in 
reality.”
While a work of architecture is presented to us di-
rectly, a representation shows it indirectly. Inversely, 
the aspects of a building that the designer wants the 
viewer to notice are often shown directly in the repre-
sentation and indirectly in the work itself, hence the 
directive quality of representation. The best experien-
tial representations are then “user’s manuals on how to 
experience a building.”
fig. 7. Drawings for the Parc de la Villette, Bernard Tschumi, 
1984. © Bernard Tschumi architects.
Note: The stationary quality of a two-dimensional representation 
is compensated for through a series of oblique frames that 
emphasize the movement of the viewer’s visual field.
fig. 8. Distance & Detail, león Krier. © university of notre 
Dame. (Krier 2009: 17).
Note: representation of the viewer’s approach toward a 
building, showing the change in attention from global 
features to small details.
For a representation to be considered as truly 
experiential, it must be able to connect the phenome-
na towards which the attention of the viewer of the re-
presentation is directed with the phenomena that are 
actually produced by the architectural object that is 
taken as the referent. An architectural representation 
depicts a referent that is not yet built; for this reason, 
the phenomena that are represented are intentional 
experiences, planned by the architect (Fig. 9).
An image showing a building under unrealistically 
ideal lighting conditions, with an unrealistically ideal 
viewing point or surrounding landscape, or a techni-
cal drawing that abstracts only the geometric features 
of an architectural work, are not representations that 
unify the experience they produce (as images) with the 
experience the building actually creates for us. Such 
images are the product of standardized methods and 
are not intended for experiencing buildings, as they are 
created by using the representational styles, techniques 
and aesthetics of the moment. These representational 
methods, whether related to projective geometry or 
specific artistic techniques, can remove all trace of the 
experiential character of a building when used unt-
hinkingly.
Likewise, the Acropolis of Athens shown through 
a bird’s eye-view animation would neglect the serial 
vision, in the words of Gordon Cullen (1961: 9), of the 
different elements that appear while walking at ground 
level. As a result, one of the main experiences planned 
for the Acropolis – and that gave it its particular confi-
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guration – would be absent from the representation. A 
representation that is independent of the specific pro-
ject on which the architect works does not promote 
awareness of the building as a producer of experiences 
and, therefore, does not function as a tool or method 
of research on the design process.
It is important to mention that the directive qua-
lity of representation is not limited to the visual form 
of architectural elements; all architectural experien-
ces – several of which are not visual – can be part of 
an experiential representation of architecture. By the 
term architectural experiences we refer to the pheno-
mena that buildings can cause in humans, i.e. those 
arising from the interaction between our senses, body 
and mind and the building. Such phenomena include 
the sensory encounter with architectural works – e.g. 
tactile, auditory, visual, etc. – , the perception of depth 
and lighting, our movements and activities in space, 
the meanings, thoughts and emotions that architecture 
produces in us, etc. This article focuses on the study of 
representations that are effective and creative in the 
way they depict the multiple phenomena produced by 
architectural works; the article is not, therefore, aimed 
at the creative design of the phenomena themselves, as 
it has already been discussed elsewhere (de la Fuente 
2013a, 2013b).
The definition of “iconic representation” should be 
expanded to include phenomena other than visual or, 
alternatively, it should be made clear that the term “expe-
riential representation” implies that what is represented 
fig. 9. Interior perspective, Museum for a Small City, 1941–43. 
© artists rights Society. (Spankie 2009: 97)
Note: Without using accurate linear perspective, Mies captures 
in this image the main experience that his buildings intend 
to create, the perceptual minimization of the architectural 
elements that define a space. The view to the outside is only 
interrupted by the vertical window bars, and the upper and 
lower horizontal planes, despite not being drawn, are implicitly 
suggested in the image. This representation shows not only 
a building, but the intention of an architectural experience. is more than just what is seen of a building. In other 
words, although the iconic representation is a human 
product created to be seen, it is not necessarily limited 
to show what can be seen. Pallasmaa (2009: 102) warns 
about this situation: “Drawing, and especially painting, 
is not solely a matter of recording the visual essence of 
the scene; the apparently visual percept conveys the en-
tire sensual essence of the thing.” (Fig. 10). This article 
aims at highlighting the multi-experiential quality of 
architecture, and is thus interested in representations 
that provide a variety of experiences. In accordance with 
this approach, it can be said that a building requires as 
many representations as there are types of experiences 
it can provide, and that each representation promotes a 
particular way of experiencing the built environment 
(directive quality of representation).
In general, a representation that is selective and 
centers the attention of the observer to certain ele-
ments or qualities of architecture could be designated 
as emphatic, while a representation that shows us all 
things with a similar level of detail, as happens with 
“realistic” renderings, could be called comprehensive. 
In the following section another dichotomy will be in-
troduced in order to better comprehend the concept of 
experiential representation.
Representing a building transformed by 
experience
These efforts to mirror a build ing before it is 
built, I would argue, only push architects furt-
her away from (rather than closer to) unders-
tanding and representing the ephemeral and in-
fig. 10. Interior study, Chapel of St. Ignatius, Seattle university, 
Washington, 1994–97. © Steven Holl architects.
Note: The irregular stains of Steven Holl’s watercolors evoke 
the tactile experiences that a building’s surfaces might 
provide us. Holl manages to direct the viewer’s attention to 
the possibility of touching the built work, a fact that usually 
escapes his or her attention in smooth-surface renderings 
created by computer.
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visible qualities found in the eventual buildings 
and spaces that make them truly fulfilling. 
(Ratinam 2012: 7).
Any representation of a building implies a certain 
opinion or conception of what the maker considers 
to be an architectural experience, in general, or the 
experience of a building, in particular. Someone who 
understands experience as that which can be seen of an 
object or scene would probably describe iconic repre-
sentation as Gubern (1987: 142–143) does, connecting 
it to the concept of visual field: “ . . . those visible sym-
bolic forms without phonetic value, which meaning is 
referred to a real or imaginary visual field . . . ” It can be 
noted that this description is equivalent to the visual re-
alism mentioned by Luquet (1927), which in the words 
of Marr (1982) corresponds to a “viewer-centered” re-
presentation. Visual realism is the counterpart of in-
tellectual realism or “object-centered” representation, 
which is not focused on the visual appearance under 
which things appear to us, but on our “knowledge” of 
them (Matthews 2002: 60).
Digital techniques that create “photorealistic” 
images are currently in the center of attention in ar-
chitectural graphic expression; such rendering tech-
niques surpass the architectural content of the images 
in relevance. Digital representations are criticized by 
Frascari (2013: 2): “ . . . the aim is to produce ‘photo-
realistic’ images that do not aim to emulate the human 
phenomenology of perception, but rather that of the 
photographic cam era.” A realistic representation in-
tends to produce an experience of an object in viewers, 
i.e. it allows the viewer to perceive in great detail the 
spatial, chromatic and lighting qualities of the depic-
ted scene. Such a representation recreates, through a 
two-dimensional medium, the light and color stimuli 
coming from the object and which is received by the 
retina; it may thus also be called pre-experiential repre-
sentation or representation to be experienced.
In addition to pre-experiential representation, the 
existence of post-experiential representation or repre-
sentation of the experienced is proposed here, which 
seeks to capture the experiences already provided by 
a work of architecture, i.e. the phenomena produced 
or planned to be produced by a building. This type of 
representation is intended to emphasize that what is 
shown is not only an object or external reality, but the 
viewer’s experience of that object. The drawing by León 
Krier (Fig. 8) shows us not only an object to pay atten-
tion to, but show us the process of paying attention to 
a building. As affirmed here, a post-experiential repre-
sentation is the type of image that truly emulates the 
phenomenology of human perception, as happens with 
Hollś s watercolors and their emphasis on the tactile 
experience of a place.
The human being’s capabilities to feel, perceive, and 
give meaning to its environment are fundamental to 
understanding the experience he or she has of it, for they 
color the world that is seen. If, as mentioned above, the 
origin of any iconic representation is a person’s past or 
present experience of objects, then it might be thought 
that all representations are post-experiential, since they 
are graphic recordings created after the experience. 
However, post-experiential representation is not simply 
the type of representation that occurs after experien-
cing a building – since even a photograph is produced 
after the experience – ; it is a representation that shows 
objects as colored by a person’s filters for apprehending 
them; it considers experience as an interpretation, mo-
dification or enhancement of certain aspects of reality, 
and shows it exactly that way (Figs 11, 12).
Both pre and post-experiential representations are 
experiential in the sense that they are interested in 
fig. 11. Panoramic view of the city center of Pskov from 
the old market side, image-based “reading”. © alexander 
Barabanov. (Barabanov 2002).
Note: While a realistic representation shows buildings “to be 
experienced,” a representation “of the experienced” is able 
to show buildings modified by psychological phenomena 
such as pareidolia. In this figure, a spontaneous and vague 
interpretation of the shapes of buildings as people is portrayed.
fig. 12. PTW, Beijing, China, 2004–2007. © CSCEC + PTW + 
CCDI and aruP.
Note: The naive interpretation of the Beijing national 
Swimming Centre’s surface as soap bubbles is made explicit 
in this post-experiential image.
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capturing or producing experiences through represen-
tational means. Nevertheless, while pre-experiential 
representations e.g. perspective views, direct our at-
tention to certain architectural elements that appear 
inside their frame from a certain point of view, post-
experiential representations are directive in a greater 
extent; they not only show us something to look at, but 
also tell us how to look at it.
As happens in the rendering of the Swimming 
Centre above, a post-experiential representation could 
be quite “realistic” in order to show an already pro-
duced experience. As can be noted, post-experiential 
representation is not synonymous with “abstract” or 
simplified representation.
In the same manner; a pre-experiential representa-
tion does not have to be realistic, comprehensive and 
detailed, but might be emphatic and concise. A hidden 
line wireframe image of a building induces us to percei-
ve its three-dimensionality (it is pre-experiential), but 
the quality of its lines is not interpreted by the observer 
as being based on a selective human experience, as they 
are clearly uniform and computer-generated (therefo-
re, it is not post-experiential). In order to clarify the 
mentioned categories, a diagram of the dichotomies is 
presented (Fig. 13).
Returning to the specific subject of post-experien-
tial representation; the perceptual experiences that ar-
chitecture creates for us may also be captured by this 
kind of representation. Choisy (1899: 407) describes the 
distortion that can be seen in a Greek temple without 
optical corrections: “While the vertical lines diverge, 
the horizontal lines of the entablature bend and turn 
their concavity toward the sky, as if the colonnade gave 
way at its center under the overload of the pediment.” 
(Free translation by the author) (Fig. 14).
A quality seen in many architectural sketches is 
directionality, with which we perceive the sharp or 
elongated shapes of some architectural compositions, 
such as those of the Streamline Moderne style. To 
the viewer, this type of building seems to make a 
straight or curved movement in a certain direction. 
By their lines, Erich Mendelsohn’s sketches, Iakov 
Chernikov’s and Antonio Sant’Elia’s visionary works 
and Zaha Hadid’s drawings emphasize the directio-
nality with which we will perceive a building’s vo-
lumes and edges once constructed. In his drawings, 
Mendelsohn establishes a clear connection between 
the strength of the stroke and the motion intensity 
with which he expects the building to be perceived 
(Fig. 15). This contradicts the belief that the thickness 
of a drawn line is not a mimetic quality, but rather 
a conventional or arbitrary one, i.e. that it is unre-
lated to the architectural referent or to the viewer’s 
experience of it: “ . . . the lines used in drawing con-
tours of objects have curvature and direction that are 
clearly depictive . . . On the other hand, the line has 
a thickness that does not correspond to any part of 
the object represented but has a descriptive meaning 
fig. 13. Dichotomies discussed in this chapter and the 
previous one; the categories on which this article has focused 
appear encircled.
fig. 14. Substitution of curves and horizontal lines in the 
Parthenon façade (Choisy 1899: 407).
Note: representation of the perceived curvature of a Greek 
temple that was not optically corrected.
fig. 15. Sketch of Schocken Department Stores, 1926–27 
(fragment). © Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (BPK).
Note: Mendelsohn transfers the intensity of the perceived 
motion of linear architectural elements to the components 
of a drawing.
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analogous to the sign systems used in the maps” (Fish 
et al. 1990: 118).
When a representation presents a suitable selection 
of a building’s qualities, it may thus result to be closely 
related to the experience we may have of that building. 
As a result, the category of the abstract, understood as 
that which is separated from experience, is inadequate 
to refer to such representations.
The concepts and dichotomies presented here are 
not immovable categories possessed by the represen-
tational objects; in certain cases it is the observer who 
decides whether to interpret a representation as pre or 
post experiential. This kind of ambiguity of interpreta-
tion may be found in the drawing of the masonry desi-
gn by Viollet-le-Duc (Fig. 5), which is pre-experiential 
if the observer considers that it provokes the experience 
of the metal structure and the domes with more detail 
than the other architectural elements. Nevertheless, 
the picture may also be interpreted as a post-experien-
tial representation that reflects the experience that an 
observer has when paying attention to a certain area 
of the building, leaving the remainder areas out of his 
consideration.
Conclusions
A representation is an object that turns a viewer’s dy-
namic experience of a building into something static, 
by capturing only some of its many possible aspects or 
qualities. The term experiential representation is inten-
ded to encompass the representation of architectural 
phenomena in general without being limited to visual 
experiences, on which iconic representation is solely 
focused.
Both its intentional creation and the possibility of 
interpreting what has been created are sine qua non 
conditions of any representation. It can be said that 
whoever creates an architectural representation should 
be knowledgeable about the experiences created by 
buildings, the representation of these experiences, and 
how people may experience or interpret such represen-
tations. Therefore, the understanding of the cognitive 
processes involved in our experience of architecture 
and our experience of representations may be useful 
if the architect wants to create truly experiential re-
presentations.
There is still much to learn from art in general, and 
cinema and comics in particular, about the represen-
tation of experiences, especially how point of view and 
framing enhance the viewer’s emotional encounter 
with buildings. There are multiple architectural expe-
riences deserving to be represented but that have not 
been included in any architectural visualization. It was 
not the intention of this article of being exhaustive in 
that regard, but to show general paths to follow in ar-
chitectural representation.
The representation of architecture should not be 
considered as independent of design, or as something 
to be performed after the architect completes the design 
process. The techniques of representation should be su-
bject to an ongoing process of experimentation and ref-
lection, as happens during an architecture project. On 
the one hand, a “realistic” pre-experiential represen-
tation is more detailed and its interpretation is closer 
to be univocal compared with the other kind of repre-
sentation. On the other hand, post-experiential repre-
sentation shows a process of experiencing an object, 
and is more capable of awakening the imagination of 
the makers and observers, allowing the emergence of 
new design ideas, as a sketch does. The combination of 
both kinds of representation in an architectural project 
would complement their strengths.
Unfortunately, due to the dominance of visual rea-
lism in architectural representation, other approaches 
to representation have been little studied. The contribu-
tion of professionals in architecture to research on re-
presentation has generally been scarce, except in a few 
cases, some of which were used to exemplify this text. 
Architects seem to lack critical background about to-
pics related to representation. In this regard, this article 
tried to make a contribution in order to fill that gap.
References
Allen, G.; Oliver, R. 1981. Architectural drawing: The art and the 
process. New York, NY: Whitney Library of Design.
Barabanov, A. A. 2002. Man and architecture: Semantics of re-
lations, International Journal of Architectural Theory, Urban 
Bodies 7(1) [online], [cited 12 September 2015]. Available 
from Internet: http://www.cloud-cuckoo.net/openarchive/
wolke/eng/Subjects/021/Barabanov/Barabanov.htm
Benjamin, W. 1980. A short history of photography, in A. 
Trachtenberg (Ed.). Classic essays on photography. New 
Haven, CT: Leete’s Island Books.
Bernath, D. 2007. The intrusive rendering: Dictation of ste-
reotypes and the extra-ordinary, Taiwan in Comparative 
Perspective 1: 37–69, [online], [cited 12 September 2015]. 
Available from Internet: http://www.lse.ac.uk/asiaResearch-
Centre/countries/taiwan/TaiwanProgramme/Journal/
JournalContents/TCP1Bernath.pdf
Black, M. 1973. How do pictures represent?, in E. H. Gombrich, 
J. Hochberg, M. Black, Art, Perception and Reality. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Boudon, P.; Poussin, F. 1993. El dibujo en la concepción ar-
quitectónica: Manual de representación gráfica [Drawing 
in Architectural Conception: Graphic Representation 
Manual]. Mexico D.F., Mexico: Limusa.
Chernikhov, Y. 1930. Osnovy sovremennoy arkhitektu-
ry [Fundamentals of Contemporary Architecture]. 
Lenningrad, Russia: Izdanie Leningradskogo obshchsestva 
Arkhitektorov [Leningrad Society of Architects Edition].
58 L. A. De La Fuente Suárez. Towards experiential representation in architecture
Choisy, A. 1899. Histoire de l’architecture, Vol. 1. Paris, France: 
Gauthier-Villars [online], [cited 12 September 2015]. 
Available  from Internet: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/
bpt6k6417116t/f419.image.r=.langEN
Cullen, G. 1961. The concise townscape . London, UK: 
Architectural Press.
de la Fuente, L. A. 2012a. Arquitectura: el diseño de una experi-
encia. [Architecture: the design of an experience]: Doctoral 
Thesis. Polytechnic University of Catalonia, BarcelonaTech, 
Barcelona, Spain.
de la Fuente, L. A. 2013b. Architecture: the design of an expe-
rience, Architektūra: patirties projektavimas, Limes: 
Borderland Studies 6 (1): 1–20. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/20297475.2012.691908
Eisner, W. 2000. Comics and sequential art: Expanded edition, 
print and computer. Tamarac, FL: Poorhouse Press.
Fish, J. & Scrivener, S. 1990. Amplifying the mind’s eye: 
Sketching and visual cognition, Leonardo 23 (1): 117–126. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1578475
Frascari, M. 2013. Models and drawings – the invisible nature 
of architecture, in M. Frascari, J. Hale, B. Starkey (Eds.). 
From models to drawings: Imagination and representation 
in architecture. London, UK: Routledge.
Goel, V. 1992. “Ill-Structured Diagrams” for Ill-Structured 
Problems [online], [cited 29 October 2015]. Association for 
the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Technical Report 
SS-92-02. Available from Internet: http://www.aaai.org/
Papers/Symposia/Spring/1992/SS-92-02/SS92-02-013.pdf
Goodman, N. 1968. Languages of art: An approach to a theory 
of symbols. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.
Gubern, R. 1987. La mirada opulenta: Exploración de la iconósfe-
ra contemporánea [The opulent look: exploration of the 
contemporary iconosphere]. Barcelona, Spain: Gustavo Gili.
Judovitz, D. 1987. Rendez-vous with Marcel Duchamp: Given, 
Dada/Surrealism 16: 184–202.
Kondor, Z. 2011. Representations and cognitive evolution: 
Towards an anthropology of pictorial representation, 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Image Science, 14: 63–81 [on-
line], [cited 12 September 2015]. Available from Internet: 
http://www.gib.uni-tuebingen.de/own/journal/upload/
d3e557b2634660fb7e972f59fce3f68a.pdf
Krier, L. 2009. Drawing for architecture. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Lockard, W. K. 1982. Design drawing. Tucson, AZ: Pepper 
Publishing.
Luquet, G. H. 1927. Le dessin enfantin. Paris, France: Alcan.
Magnago Lampugnani, V. 1983. Dibujos y textos de la arqui-
tectura del siglo XX: Utopía y realidad [Drawings and texts 
of the twentieth century architecture: utopia and reality]. 
Barcelona, Spain: Gustavo Gili.
Marr, D. 1982. Vision: A computational investigation into hu-
man representation and processing of visual information. 
San Francisco, CA: Freeman.
Matthews, J. 2002. Dentro del cuadro: Reconsiderando el re-
alismo intelectual y visual en el dibujo infantil. [Whithin 
the picture: reconsidering intellectual and visual realism 
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